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Abstract
The education revolution on horseback I: The relation between Napoleon Bonaparte 
and education system characteristics**
Much research has been done into the emergence of mass education systems, primarily 
by studying the social origin of the education system, the introduction of compulsory 
schooling laws, or the expansion of enrolment rates. However, little is known about 
the origin of the characteristics of these newly formed systems. Ramirez and Boli 
(1987) argue that the threat for war with and invasion by the French around the 1800s 
induced European countries to introduce mass public education systems. This paper 
empirically establishes whether political pressure from Napoleon is related to the levels 
of differentiation and standardization of European education systems. I find that the 
political pressure from France is related to differentiation, but less to standardization 
of the content of instruction, and not at all to the existence of central exam and 
administrative standardization.
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1. Introduction 
For many people in the western world it would be difficult to imagine society without a 
universal and compulsory primary and secondary education system. However, mass public 
education is a relatively recent institution: the first mass public education systems emerged 
only in the nineteenth century. While in 2012 the enrolment rate at age 6 was on average 98% 
for OECD countries, with a minimum of 91% in Chile and the Slovak Republic (OECD, 
2014), in 1870 primary education enrolment varied in Europe between 13% in Portugal and 
75% in France (Soysal and Strang, 1989). 
 
Research into the emergence of mass public education often entails case studies arguing for 
each country why the specific situation of that country led to the introduction of the nation 
specific education system (e.g. Archer, 1979; Go and Lindert, 2007). These case studies are 
often followed by theoretical reflections on common trends or sources of variation of the 
emergence of mass public education. Other work looks at cross country variation to find 
patterns of how mass public education spread (e.g. Soysal and Strang, 1989; Meyer et al., 
1992). However, both strands of the literature focus on the emergence of mass public 
education systems itself. The aim of this paper is to look at the characteristics of these 
emerged mass public education systems.  
 
In the education systems in Europe geographical clusters of countries can be distinguished. 
For instance, related to tracking, Scandinavian counties and the UK have very similar 
comprehensive education systems with only one track available to students and late selection. 
Contrary to that, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria have highly 
tracked systems with a high number of tracks and, in Germany and Austria, selection as early 
as 10 years old. These geographical clusters found in European education systems can be 
explained by Ramirez and Boli (1987) who propose that the threat of war with and annexation 
by the French in the 1800s caused countries to set up mass public education systems.  
 
The late 18th century in Europe was quite volatile with the Enlightenment, best seen by the 
French Revolution of 1789 and the Napoleonic Wars. The era of Napoleon Bonaparte started 
in 1800 when he made himself First Council of France. The following two decades the Wars 
dominated European politics and daily life, until 1815 when Napoleon was defeated at Battle 
of Waterloo. As laid out by Ramirez and Boli (1987), these external challenges induced 
European countries to create a national identity. An important part of this nation building, 
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which would lead to a national identity, was the introduction of mass public educational 
systems by the national state. This was mainly intended to educate the future generations in 
the cultural and political traditions of the nation. Creating a national identity in war times is 
important for states since it increases the public’s (physical and mental) willingness to pay 
(through taxes) and fight for the survival of their own nation in order to remain independent.  
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the proposed mechanism by Ramirez and Boli 
(1987) is related to the level of differentiation, i.e. tracking, and standardization in European 
education systems. I use data on education system characteristics for 29 European countries. 
The analyses show that there is a relation between the political pressure from France in the 
1800s and some, although not all, aspects of current day European educational systems. The 
political pressure from France in the 1800s, as theorized of Ramirez and Boli (1987), is 
related to tracking, both seen by the number of tracks available to fifteen-year-old students 
and by the age of first selection. There is only a small relation between the influence of 
Napoleon and standardization of the content of instruction, and no relation with the existence 
of central exams or administrative standardization, which concerns standardization for teacher 
hiring, salary increases, and formulating school budgets. 
 
This paper is structured as follows: The next section provides a theoretical background on the 
emergence of mass public education systems and provides some insights into possible 
mechanisms for the origin of education system characteristics. This is followed by a 
discussion of the theory of Ramirez and Boli (1987) and an introduction to the history of 
French influence in the 1800s. Section 5 describes the data, while Section 6 presents evidence 
for the relation between political pressure from Napoleon and characteristics of education 
system. Finally, Section 7 provides a conclusion and a discussion. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
The literature on the emergence of mass public educations systems consists mainly of case 
studies on single countries or multiple countries, focused most often on France, Germany, 
England and the United States. The case studies of multiple countries are often followed by 
theoretical reflections on common trends or sources of variation. Some authors looked 
empirically at common trends in cross country variation. To my knowledge no researchers 
focused on formation of the characteristics of mass public education systems. However, in 
previous literature sometimes mechanisms explaining characteristics of mass public education 
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systems are indirectly discussed. A few examples of this are given below. The theory of 
Ramirez and Boli (1987), which this paper uses extensively, is discussed in Section 3. 
 
I focus here on the early emergence of mass public education systems. However, there is also 
extensive literature on the later expansion of education systems (e.g. Meyer et al., 1977; 
Goldin and Katz, 1997; 1998). 
 
2.1 Cross country analyses 
The most often mentioned causes for the emergence of mass public education systems, 
coming for theoretical and empirical works, are state interest in educated civilians and 
interaction among social groups in society and previous suppliers of education. Archer (1979) 
and Boli and Ramirez (1986) provide two major examples covering, respectively conflict 
theory and world society theory, which dominate the theories into the emergence of mass 
public education systems. There are also more descriptive histories without providing a 
comprehensive theory (e.g. Mueller et al., 1987; Cummings, 2010). 
 
A very comprehensive analysis of the emergence of mass public education using multiple 
case studies is Margaret Archer’s book Social origins of educational systems (1979). In this 
book Archer explains the rise of mass education systems based on the interactions of social 
groups within society. For this she uses the origins of the education systems in England, 
France, Russia, and Denmark as examples for her theory. Before the late 18th or 19th century, 
control of existing education systems was held by the dominant social group in society (often 
churches in various forms) and it supplied the graduates this dominant social group desired. 
Endogenous change of education systems could not be initiated because the education sector 
was dependent on the dominant group for all its inputs, like schools, teachers, and books. A 
theory of educational change, Archer argues, will thus have to be able to explain educational 
change from outside the education sector where the dominant social group was challenged by 
opposing social groups. These “assertive groups” were not (fully) able to benefit from the 
education system (and its outputs) and therefore these groups, when it became profitable, tried 
to diminish or even destroy the power the dominant group had on the educational system and 
setup a mass public education system. 
 
Boli and Ramirez (1986) argue that education systems must be seen as institutions in a 
transnational world, and thus that the emergence of education systems was not due to local 
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national events alone but that these systems emerged as part of the world culture.
1
 The 
emergence of mass public education systems was possible due to (1) the increased importance 
of the individual in everyday thinking, (2) the move from seeing children as miniature adults 
to creatures of innocence needing education, (3) the emergence of the state and nationalism, 
(4) changes in religion and religious practices, (5) the emergence of the nation-state in a 
transnational world, and (6) economic expansion. The emergence of the nation-state was vital 
since it was mainly the increased (economic and strategic) competition between countries that 
induced countries to introduce mass public education systems.  
 
Soysal and Strang (1989) provide an empirical cross country investigation into the emergence 
of mass public education systems. They look at the timing of compulsory schooling laws and 
the growth in primary school enrolment in 17 western countries and focus primarily on the 
role of the relation between state and church in this. Soysal and Strang (1989) find that in 
countries which had a national church, compulsory schooling laws were introduced earlier, 
possibly because having a national church meant there was little conflict with the previous 
provider of schooling, since these were most often churches. But for countries without a 
national church, the earlier a country had compulsory schooling laws the less growth in 
enrolment it had, possibly because those states lacked organizational strength to set up public 
education systems. 
 
Meyer et al. (1992) consider common factors for one aspect of the formation of mass public 
education: the expansion of enrollment in education. They find that the timing of entry into 
mass public education mattered and that this depended on the integration of the country in the 
world society. But once countries formed mass public education systems, all followed the 
same pattern in their enrollment expansion. Thus a common pattern was found for a wide 
variety of countries.  
 
2.2 Single country case studies 
In studies where only a single country or education system is studied the reasons for the 
emergence of education and its early expansion are very diverse. Since country specific 
circumstances are not the focus of this paper, the following recent studies, which are by no 
means exhaustive, are merely for illustrative purposes.  
 
                                                          
1. Another example of how the state became interested in mass public education for nation building is Green (1990). 
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Becker and Woessman (2006) look at an outcome measure of mass education, the spread of 
literacy in Prussia. Becker and Woessman (2006) find a positive effect of the spread of 
Protestantism, in which followers are encouraged to read the Bible themselves, on literacy 
rates, pointing towards a religion induced emergence of education. Westberg (2015) ties the 
emergence of mass public education in Sweden to the construction of school buildings, which 
were required to facilitate the emergence of the mass public education system. For the United 
States, scholars emphasize the decentralized nature of the emergence of the education system 
and focus more on local circumstance which influenced the costs of education and voting 
power as reasons for expansion (Beadie, 2010; Go and Lindert 2007).  
 
2.3 Characteristics of mass public education systems 
An example of how the origins of the characteristics of education systems were indirectly 
discussed is Archer (1979). As described above, Archer’s book explains the rise of mass 
education systems in terms of interactions of social groups within society. She continues by 
posing that change in education systems arose using one of two strategies. One strategy, the 
substitutive strategy, was that existing schools and curricula, controlled by the initially 
dominant group, were supplemented by schools and curricula from an assertive group. The 
other strategy, the restrictive strategy, was that the existing education system was forced to 
obey the regulations of an assertive group, which obtained, and was able to execute, state 
control, and was transformed accordingly. Following these, whether the substitutive or 
restrictive strategy was used points towards an explanation for the level of standardization and 
the extent of tracking in the education system in a country. In the countries where substitutive 
strategies were used, multiple school systems existed alongside each other as separate 
“tracks” and standardization was low. But in countries where restrictive strategies where used, 
the existing school system was transformed in one single “new” school system using state 
regulations. Following this, differentiation was low and standardization was high. 
 
Another example of a study which indirectly discusses possible mechanisms for the origins of 
education system characteristics is Boli et al. (1985). Boli et al. (1985) describe two 
development paths of education systems which were used to transform individuals into 
members of society: the model of “creating societal members” and the model of “creating 
members of the nation-state”. The model of creating societal members would lead to a “top 
down model”: a decentralized education system with little regional variation since the societal 
model was identical across regions. Such a structure could have led to low levels of 
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standardization and high levels of autonomy, but also to low levels of differentiation since all 
followed the same societal model. The model of creating members of the nation state would 
lead to a uniform education system so that all citizens would adhere to the same set of 
principles and ideas and it would be more rule based. Countries which followed this model 
would display stronger standardization and low autonomy. 
 
Soysal and Strang (1989) argue that a unified education system was more likely when private 
and religious parties worked together and did not oppose each other. Churches often opposed 
the attempts of the state to introduce mass public education, especially when they themselves 
fulfilled that role at that point in time. But when the church and state were very intertwined, 
for instance when the country had a national church, a unified education system could still 
emerge even though the church was previously the principal supplier. Similarly to the 
implications from Archer (1979) this could imply more standardization and less 
differentiation in such systems. 
 
3. Ramirez and Boli (1987): The Political Construction of Mass Schooling 
This section provides a discussion of the theory proposed by Ramirez and Boli (1987). This 
theory relates external challenges of the country to the introduction of mass public education 
systems. The different stages of this process are discussed, and examples are given.  
 
3.1 A theory on the origins of education systems
2
 
In their 1987 paper The Political Construction of Mass Schooling: European Origins and 
Worldwide Institutionalization Ramirez and Boli present their theory on how external 
pressure led to similar events in multiple countries which eventually led to the introduction of 
mass public education systems in the nineteenth century. Or as said by Ramirez and Boli 
(1987): “Our view is that European states became engaged in authorizing, funding, and 
managing mass schooling as a part of the endeavor to construct a unified national policy. […] 
External challenges […] were important stimuli to state action in education […]” (p. 3). Of 
the external challenges on the European continent in this era the Napoleon Wars were perhaps 
the most extreme. The external challenges were not purely military pressure; it was a broader 
political pressure: it was a reaction to the French, but not imposed by the French army. These 
challenges caused countries to set up mass public education systems. 
                                                          
2. This section is based upon Ramirez and Boli (1987). 
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The theory of Ramirez and Boli (1987) is formed by using case studies of seven European 
regions: Prussia, Denmark, Austria, Sweden, Italy, France, and England. Prussia and 
Denmark were early in setting up mass public education systems. Sweden, France, and 
England follow later. Italy is an intermediate case since the South was relatively late (like 
France and England), while the North was relatively early (like Prussia and Denmark). This 
supports the claim by Ramirez and Boli (1987) that regions that faced external challenges 
introduced mass public education systems while “the most dominant powers were able to 
resist the system wide pressures favoring mass education […].” (Ramirez and Boli, 1987, p. 
4). 
 
Although national events and characteristics naturally played a large role in the origins of 
education systems, Ramirez and Boli (1987) focus only on “transnational similarities in the 
institutional character of state educational systems” (p. 2). Each of the regions discussed by 
Ramirez and Boli showed the same pattern in response to external challenges. These patterns 
follow four steps (p. 9). First there was a “declaration of a national interest in mass 
education”.  In Germany this can be seen by an address by the German philosopher Johann 
Gottlieb Fichte in 1807 which stated that “universal state-directed, compulsory education 
would teach all Germans to be good Germans and would prepare them to play whatever role 
[…] fell to them in helping the state reassert Prussian power” (p. 5). In Denmark this can be 
seen by the claims between 1807 and 1814 by N.F.S. Grundvig, a clergyman, that education 
“[is] a means for Denmark to regain its spiritual and national strength” (p. 6). Also in Italy: 
“Education was seen as a means of increasing Italian power and prestige” (p. 7). 
 
The second step on the route towards mass public education was “legislation to make 
schooling compulsory”. Although most states had some legislation of education in place in 
the 18
th
 century, often it was neither mandatory, nor universal, nor free. Secondly, in some 
cases legislation was set up but the necessary funds were not delivered and thus the legislation 
was not put into practice, as was for instance the case in Prussia in 1717 and in Denmark in 
1739. Prussia was one of the first regions which provided state mass education and also 
established a tax instrument to finance it, but only after 1817.  
 
With the legislation in place, the “creation of a state educational ministry or department” and 
the “establishment of state authority over existing and new schools” were possible. Prussia 
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established a Bureau of Education in 1806 and after 1817 the state provided certification of 
teachers, while in England only in 1944 a national ministry of education was formed to act as 
the central education authority. Churches often had influence on education until well in the 
19th century. In Austria in 1855 full control of education was given back from the state to the 
church and even in Prussia, the government announced in 1844 that “religious instruction is 
more important than pedagogical theory”. 
 
3.2 Education system characteristics and possible mechanisms 
Although previous literature has stated theories on the emergence of education systems, it has 
not done so for the emergence of education system characteristics. Also the theory of 
Ramirez and Boli (1987) only states that countries that faced external challenges set up mass 
public education systems earlier than other countries. It does not speak about the 
characteristics of these education systems. In Section 2.3 a possible explanation for the levels 
of differentiation and standardization following Archer (1987) was already given: When the 
state introduced the mass public education system, it could take over existing schools 
(restrictive strategy), or newly formed mass public education schools could existed side by 
side with already existing schools, with perhaps different curricula and structures (substitutive 
strategy). States that introduced an overall education system early on (for instance those states 
that were under external pressure) had probably weaker state systems than those who 
introduced an overall education system later, simple because states got more developed and 
centralized over time. When the education system was introduced earlier, perhaps more often 
the state system existed next to the existing system, or in other words substitutive strategies 
were used. These substitutive strategies might have led to different school types within one 
system, or in other words different tracks. And it might also be that these different school 
types had different pedagogical views, textbooks, and courses and therefore standardization 
might be low. Countries that formed education system later could force the existing schools 
into a unified system with low levels of differentiation and high levels of standardization.  
 
The above example of how the timing of the emergence of mass public education influenced 
the characteristics of the mass public education systems is only for illustrative purposes. In the 
rest of this paper I link the theory of Ramirez and Boli (1987) on the origin of education 
systems to characteristics of education systems. I do not extensively discuss the mechanisms 
at play, but I acknowledge that more insights into the mechanisms are necessary. 
 
9 
 
4. The Napoleonic wars
3
 
The external challenges, referred to by Ramirez and Boli (1987) were in most cases (political) 
pressure arising from the French army and later, and foremost, from Napoleon Bonaparte. The 
current section gives a short summary of the Napoleonic wars and its impact on the European 
continent. 
 
After the turmoil of the French Revolution and its aftermath, Napoleon Bonaparte, a general 
who just secured victories for France in Italy, Austria, and Egypt
4
, was called in to support a 
coup d’état by the National Convention, consisting of the bourgeois who wanted to overthrow 
the everlasting power of the clergy and the nobility. However, Napoleon took power for 
himself in November 1799 and declared himself First Consul in 1800.  
 
Almost as soon as Napoleon took power, he invaded neighboring countries, annexed 
Piedmont in Italy, the Rhineland in Germany and Belgium, and appointed himself president of 
the Republic of Italy and Mediator of the Swiss Confederation. In 1802 the peace treaty of 
Amiens was signed by France, England, Holland (part of the current day Netherlands) and 
Spain. But the peace did not last long as Napoleon kept intervening in neighboring countries 
and setting up strategic positions against England, the most dominant (naval) power at the 
time. Soon after his coronation as Emperor of France in 1804, Napoleon annexed the Ligurian 
Republic (1805, Italy, south of Piedmont). In response, in 1805 the Russian Empire and 
England formed an alliance against France, which Austria (the Habsburger Empire), Sweden, 
and Naples later also joined. Napoleon formed alliances with Spain and Bavaria in return. 
Despite the alliance with Russia and England, Austria was conquered and was given harsh 
settlement terms and had to give up a number of territories. France was also able to force 
Prussia into submission: Prussia had to end trade with England but received the conquered 
region of Hanover from France in return. Napoleon conquered Berlin and later also invaded 
Prussia’s Poland and established the Duchy of Warsaw. On his way east, Napoleon 
successfully fought Prussia and Russia in 1807. Following that defeat, Russia had to 
acknowledge Napoleon’s brothers as rulers of Naples, Holland, and Westphalia and in return 
Napoleon would leave the Baltics states and Turkey alone. Prussia had to give up territories to 
                                                          
3. This paragraph is based on Santon and MacKay (2010) and Chapter 1 and 13 of Grab (2003). 
4. Napoleons journey to Egypt did not end as well as it started. After Napoleon conquered Egypt, and with it was able to 
frustrate the trade routes of England, he lost most of its fleet in the Battle of Aboukir and was unable to return home. 
Napoleon ruled Egypt for over about a year before leaving behind his army and returning to France in 1799. 
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the Kingdom of Westphalia and the Duchy of Warsaw, which were under Napoleons 
influence, pay damages, and accept limitations on its army.  
 
In 1808, while the French army was mostly tied up in Spain, Austria started to make 
preparations to go to war against France. The war was fought in Germany, Austria Italy, and 
Poland and in 1809 Austria conceded. France received the Illyrian Provinces (“Croatia”), 
while also Bavaria and the Duchy of Warsaw received lands from Austria. Furthermore, 
Austria had to pay damages and obey limitations on its army. Later Napoleon married the 
daughter of Francis I, the emperor of Austria, and thus formed an alliance between both 
houses. Pope Pius VII opposed the marriage, as he had not approved Napoleon’s divorce from 
his former wife Josephine, and also refused to prevent England ships from using its ports. In 
response Napoleon marched south to Rome. In 1809 Napoleon had taken over control of 
Rome and the remaining Papal States and exiled Pope Pius. 
 
Napoleon became less popular in France over the year with the continued fighting, the exile 
of Pope Pius VII in 1809, and continued trade blockades. Napoleon advanced into Russia 
since they did not uphold the agreed trade blockage towards England, but was unsuccessful. 
Following that defeat Russia, Prussia, England, Sweden, and Austria united against France. 
Napoleon also faced problems at other fronts and he abdicated when Paris was taken in April 
1814. After the Battle of Waterloo, Napoleon was defeated and he was exiled to St. Helena 
where he died in 1821. 
 
Under Napoleons reign the French Empire grew substantially: At the height of the French 
Empire in 1810 it covered an area of 750,000 square kilometers (293,000 square miles) as 
compared to 543,965 square kilometer (210,026 square miles) for Metropolitan France today. 
There were “allied countries whose territory was expanded by Napoleon in some cases, and 
continued to be governed by their native rulers”, like Bavaria and Sweden. Grab (2003) calls 
these the pays allies. The conquered or annex countries were either “countries annexed to 
France and directly ruled by Napoleon” (pays réunis), like Belgium and Piedmont, or 
“satellite states that were entrusted to French rulers” (pays conquis), like Spain and 
Switzerland (Grab, 2003). But not all territories were under French control. Figure 1 shows 
the categorization of Europe by Grab.  
 
---Figure 1 here--- 
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5. Data and method 
The data used in this paper covers 29 countries in the sphere of influence of 1800s France. I 
use data on the level of differentiation in education systems, the level of standardization in 
education systems, and the political pressure from Napoleon from various sources.  
 
5.1 Sample of countries 
In this paper only countries in the direct sphere of influence of Napoleon are included, which 
limits the countries to European countries. France itself is excluded since the proposed theory 
of political pressure from the French does not work on France itself. The included European 
countries are Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, 
Finland, United Kingdom, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Sweden.  
 
In a few instances it was possible to divide countries into regions more suitable for either the 
historical categorization of the French threat (Germany and Italy) or for the display of 
education systems (Germany, Belgium and Great Britain). Germany and Italy were not yet 
united countries in the 1800s. In Germany a large number of states, city states and kingdoms 
existed and the borders and the independence of these regions changed numerous times. 
Germany is therefore split into 6 regions: Bavaria, Hanover, Prussia, Rhineland, Saxony, 
Westphalia.
5
 Italy was similar to Germany in the 1800s in the sense that it consisted of a 
number of states and kingdoms and was only later united in a single country. For the analyses 
here Italy was split into 3 regions: the North West, the Republic of Italy, and the Kingdom of 
Naples.
6 
Both Belgium and Great Britain are divided in two regions that better represent the 
                                                          
5. To be able to match the current German states to the regions in the 1800s a division of Germany is made. In this paper 
Westphalia refers to the current German states Hesse and North Rhine-Westphalia. The Rhineland is the German states 
Saarland and Rhineland-Palatinate. Prussia consists of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Berlin, Brandenburg, and Saxony-
Anhalt. Bavaria is Bavaria and Baden-Wurttemberg. Hanover consists of the German states Hamburg, Bremen, and 
Lower Saxony, while Saxony refers to Saxony and Thuringia. Schleswig-Holstein belonged to Denmark around 1800 
and is therefore display as a single territory in the historical maps and is excluded from the maps depicting 
standardization. The standardization maps are made using PISA2006 data and it would be very difficult and arbitrary to 
add the Danish and Schleswig-Holstein data to create one “Greater Denmark”. The division of German states into the 
regions described above, instead of using all German states separately, is used since it is not allowed to display results 
for individual German states using the PISA 2006 data. It is allowed however to use clusters of states, which led to the 
creation of the region described here. 
6. This paper distinguishes four regions in Italy in the 1800s: The North West consisting of current day Liguria, Piemont, 
and Sardinia, The Republic of Italy consisting of Bolzano, Trento, Emilia-Romagna, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Lombardy, 
and Veneto,  The Kingdom of Naples: Basilicata, Campania, Puglia, Provincia Sicilia. The other Italian provinces are 
Abruzzo, Lazio, Marche, Molise, Tuscany, Umbria, Valle d'Aosta, and Calabria. Of these eight provinces the first six 
can be regarded as the Papal State while Valle d'Aosta could be assigned to the North West and Calabria was part of the 
Kingdom of Naples. However, in PISA2006 it not possible to distinguish between these eight provinces and therefore 
these provinces are excluded from the maps and analysis using standardization. 
12 
 
education systems (and also the cultural regions). Belgium is divided in the Flemish region 
and the French region (including the German speaking parts), while Great Britain is divided in 
Scotland and the region consisting of England, Wales, and Northern-Ireland. These 
subdivisions lead to a total of 29 regions, which is referred to as countries from now on for 
simplicity. 
 
5.2 Data on education systems 
The focus here is on two main education system characteristics: the level of differentiation 
and the level of standardization in education systems.  
 
Differentiation is measured both by the number of distinct education programs (tracks) 
available to students at age 15 and by the age of first selection. Data on the number of tracks 
are from the OECD (2007, Table 5.2) and adjusted for Flemish and French Belgium (using 
information on Eurydice) and for the Germany states (using Woessmann, 2007). Data on the 
age of first selection are from the OECD (2007, Table 5.2) and adjusted for Flemish and 
French Belgium (using information from Eurydice) and for the Germany states (using 
Kultusminister Konferenz, 2013). Descriptive statistics on differentiation are shown in Figure 
2 and Table 1. Table 1 shows that for the 29 countries the number of tracks varies between 1 
(a comprehensive system) to 5. Some countries select students already at age 10, while others 
select only at age 16. Figure 2 shows that countries in the periphery of Europe have less 
differentiation (both measured by the age of first selection and by the number of tracks) than 
countries in the inner region. 
 
---Figure 2 here--- 
---Table 1 here--- 
 
Standardization is split into standardization of outputs and standardization of inputs. Outputs 
are standardized when students are required to learn the same curriculum. A proxy for this is 
whether or not an education system has central exit examination (CEE). Data on CEEs 
examinations are from OECD (2011, Table D5.1a) and adjusted for the German states using 
Juerges et al. (2005). Unfortunately, for Switzerland, Croatia and Slovenia I have no 
information on the existence of CEEs. Table 1 shows that 42 percent of countries in the 
sample have CEEs, while Figure 2 shows the same data per country. 
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Data on input standardization are from the Program for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) 2006, and relates to answers given by school principals on who has authority for the 
textbooks, course content, teacher appointments, teacher employment conditions, and budget. 
These last five variables are transformed into two country averages, one on the administrative 
aspects (consisting of information on teacher hiring, salary increases and formulating the 
budget) and standardization on content related issues (consisting of information on textbook 
choice and course content). Table 1 shows there is large variation in the amount of 
standardization across countries. Figure 2 shows the same data per country. 
 
5.3 Data on the political pressure from Napoleon 
The political threat from Napoleon is modelled in this paper in three ways. The first is by the 
distance of one’s own capital to Paris. The air distance between Paris and the capital around 
1800 in Table 1 is given in kilometres, where 500 kilometres are added for a sea crossing. 
Belgium’s Brussels is closest to Paris with a distance of 264 km, while Finland’s capital of 
Turku is furthest away with 2304 km.  
 
In the 1800s there were more empires in Europe than just the French Empire. Belonging to an 
empire would have either protected the country from outside threat due to the larger 
protective force of an empire compared to a (smaller) country and thus lowered the threat 
from Napoleon, or it would have increased the threat when there were struggles between 
Napoleon and the empire in question. The countries belonging to empires in the nineteenth 
century are shown in Figure 3. Together with the distance to Paris, this is a proxy of the ex-
ante political threat of Napoleon, since it uses the threat for those at the time and does not 
display simple those countries that were actually involved in the fighting. 
 
---Figure 3 here--- 
 
A measure of the ex-post threat used in this paper is the categorization by Grab (2003), as 
explained in Section 4 and shown in Figure 1 before. This is an ex-post measure since it 
relates to which countries were actually annexed and not which countries were under threat. 
The categorization from Grab (2003) divides the European countries into pays réunis, pays 
conquis, and pays allies.  
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Table 2 provides pairwise correlations between the independent and dependent variables in 
the coming analyses. The two measures of differentiation are highly correlated (-0.59), while 
the standardization measures are much less correlated (in absolute values all between 0.01 and 
0.33). The correlation between the distance to Paris and the categorization from Grab (2003) 
is also quite substantial. However, the correlation between the Grab dummies is rather low. 
Looking at the correlations, the distance to Paris seems to be predictive for less 
differentiation. The next section discusses this further. 
 
---Table 2 here--- 
 
5.4 Methodology 
The model estimated in this paper is depicted in equation (1). It relates education system 
characteristics, 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖, to proxies depicting the political pressure from Napoleon, 
𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑂𝑁𝑖, for country i. The education system characteristics are differentiation and 
standardization, as mentioned above. The political pressure from Napoleon is proxied by five 
different variables described above: the distance between one’s own capital and Paris, 
whether the country belonged to an empire and a categorization of annexed and conquered 
countries. 
𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑂𝑁𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (1) 
 
To investigate which proxies for the political pressure from Napoleon can best capture the 
variation in the data four models are estimated for each education system characteristic. The 
four models each use a different combination of the five available proxies.  
 
6. Results 
This section supplements the theory of Ramirez and Boli (1987) by empirical evidence that 
the political pressure from Napoleon is related to characteristics of European education 
systems. 
 
Table 3 shows different models relating the distance to Paris, whether or not countries 
belonged to an empire, and the categorization by Grab (2003) to the number of tracks 
available in a country. The first model shows only the relation between distance and the 
number of tracks available and shows a strong negative correlation, meaning that the further 
away one’s own capital is from Paris the fewer tracks its education systems will have. The 
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size of the coefficients tells us that moving away 500 kilometers from Paris (about one 
standard deviation in the sample) leads to one less track. Whether this interpretation of the 
coefficient is very informative is unclear since the distance is just a proxy of the political 
pressure of Napoleon. 
 
---Table 3 here--- 
 
Model 2 uses both the distance and the empire dummy, and is therefore the preferred model 
since it relates most closely to the ex-ante political threat by Napoleon. This model has a lot 
of power, explaining forty-five percent of the variation in differentiation. Countries belonging 
to an empire in 1800 have one more track available to students than countries not belonging to 
an empire in 1800. But again this precise interpretation of the coefficient is probably not fully 
informative. The coefficient for the distance to Paris is very similar to the previous model.  
 
Model 3 uses the historical categorization of Grab combined with distance. Model 4 includes 
all independent variables and these are jointly significant.  
 
The four models do remarkably well: They explain twenty-nine to forty-five percent of the 
variation and the variables in all models are jointly significant. The estimates say that 
countries that have their capital further away from Paris have fewer tracks available to pupils 
nowadays. Countries that were part of an empire have more tracks. Annexed countries ruled 
by Napoleon (pays réunis) have more tracks, while other annexed or allied countries have 
fewer tracks.  
 
Table 4 shows the same models but now for the age of first selection. Also here the models 
are capable of explaining a significant part of the variation in the age of selection. Almost all 
the coefficients have the reversed signs as compared to Table 3. This is to be expected since 
the number of tracks available in a country and the age of first selection are highly negatively 
correlated (-0.59 in this sample). However all four models show considerably lower adjusted 
R squared than in Table 3. 
 
---Table 4 here--- 
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Table 5 shows the models using central examinations as dependent variable. What is 
immediately clear is that although the pressure of Napoleon has a relation to the two measures 
of differentiation; it has no such relation with central exit examinations. No model has jointly 
significant variables and the adjusted R squared is negligible. Perhaps the existence of central 
exit examination is too recent to be affected by the political pressure from Napoleon, or the 
use of central exit examinations changed too much over the years. 
 
---Table 5 here--- 
 
Table 6 shows how that the pressure from Napoleon is also not related to the level of 
standardization on administrative issues. None of the coefficients is significant, also not 
jointly. 
 
---Table 6 here--- 
 
The relation between the pressure from Napoleon and content related standardization is very 
small, but Model 3 of Table 7 does show jointly significant correlations. Annexed countries 
rules by Napoleon (pays réunis) seem to have more content related standardization. 
 
---Table 7 here--- 
 
All in all, pressure from Napoleon does seem to have a relation with some aspects of 
education systems in Europe; most notably with differentiation, as seen by the number of 
tracks and age of selection, and content related standardization. For the number of tracks in a 
country, the proposed variables are able to explain twenty-nine to forty-five percent of the 
cross country variation. For the age of selection the pressure from Napoleon is able to explain 
around twenty percent. These results therefore provide support for the thesis of Ramirez and 
Boli (1987). 
 
7. Conclusion and discussion 
The existence of almost universal enrolment of children in public schools is relatively recent. 
Only in the nineteenth century did countries start forming mass public education systems. 
Although each country had its own specific circumstance during, and causes for, the 
emergence of these education system, research has found common factors and trends across 
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countries. However, little is known about why countries shaped their education systems as 
they did, or in other words how the characteristics of the newly formed education system 
came about. Since the setup of most western education systems have changed only marginally 
since their initial introduction, the characteristics of most education systems we see today are 
mainly due to history and tradition and thus the initial characteristics of the education systems 
keep influencing students today. Furthermore, the characteristics of education systems, for 
instance the levels of differentiation and standardization, affect student performance today 
(e.g. Hanushek and Woessman, 2006) which affects later life outcomes. Therefore, it is 
relevant to know more about the origin of education system characteristics.  
 
This paper builds on the 1987 paper of Ramirez and Boli The Political Construction of Mass 
Schooling: European Origins and Worldwide Institutionalization. In this paper, Ramirez and 
Boli argue that the introduction of European education systems in the nineteenth century was 
induced by external challenges on the continent. One of the most pronounced challenges was 
the political pressure from Napoleon, who dominated the continent for two decades. Almost 
all European countries were at one stage involved with Napoleon and many wars were fought 
on numerous battlefields. To unite the people and ensure a strong and willing workforce, 
countries introduced mass public education systems to educate the people as citizens of the 
nation willing to fight for independence. In this manner, political pressure from Napoleon had 
an influence on European education systems.  
 
The current paper empirically tests whether the proposed mechanism of Ramirez and Boli 
(1987) also is related to the level of differentiation and standardization in European education 
systems. Especially for differentiation, both seen by the number of tracks and age of selection, 
a relation between education systems and the political pressure from Napoleon in the 
nineteenth century is found. The preferred models which capture the ex-ante political pressure 
from Napoleon are able to explain thirty-two to forty-five of the cross country variation in the 
number of tracks available to students and little below twenty percent for the age of selection. 
For standardization relating to the instructional content, school administration or the existence 
of central exit exams, no or a much weaker relation is found. Still, the theory proposed by 
Ramirez and Boli (1987) is supported by empirical evidence on specific education system 
characteristics. Although previous studies have sometimes indirectly addressed possible 
mechanisms for the formation of the characteristics of mass public education systems, none 
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have focused on this. This paper makes a first attempt at analyzing historical education system 
characteristics, but does little to explain the mechanisms which played a role.  
 
In the early literature of the effect of education on aggregate outcomes, such as gross 
domestic product (GDP) or average student performance, the focus was on years of education 
or enrolment rates, or said differently on the “quantity of education” (e.g. Barro, 1991). Later 
the focus shifted to the “quality of education” captured by test score averages or education 
system characteristics. These measures were better able to capture the actual difference in 
human capital across countries (e.g. Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Hanushek and Woessman, 
2006; Hanushek and Woessman, 2009). The focus of studies on the emergence of mass public 
education systems is still mainly on the “quantity of education”, for instance by looking at 
enrolment rates. I argue that also here a shift to the qualitative aspects of the emergence of 
mass public education systems is in order. This analogue with analyses on the effect of 
education on aggregate outcomes provides a possible new direction for the field of the 
emergence of mass public education. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: The reach of the French Empire (based on Grab, 2003) 
 
 
 
Note 1: The Netherlands and Poland were both pays réunis and pays conquis.  
Note 2: The borders of the maps used in this paper are drawn by using the command spmap in 
Stata making use of the Shape files and the dBase databases of the European countries found 
on www.gamd.org. Thus the maps here are drawn using the current borders of the European 
countries. This means that country borders in the historical maps could (and most probably 
will) deviate from the historical borders in a number of ways. For simplicity it is chosen here 
to ignore these changes. 
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Figure 2: Education systems in Europe 
a. Number of tracks 
 
b. Age of first selection 
 
c. Central exit exams 
 
d. Administrative administration 
 
e. Content administration 
 
23 
 
 
Notes: The borders are drawn at the lowest possible level at which the data are available. In 
the case of the number of tracks, the age of first selection and the central exit exams this 
means at the country level, or at the region level for French Belgium and Flemish Belgium 
and for England and Scotland, or at the state level for Germany. The borders for 
standardization deviate from this, in the sense that the lowest possible level for Germany is 
the state cluster level. See also Notes of Figure 1. 
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Figure 3: Empires in Europe around 1800s 
 
 
 
Notes: These maps are based on the Centennia Historical Atlas. Regions of Poland belonged 
to either Prussia (the North West), the Habsburger Empire (the south), and the Russian 
Empire (the east). See also Note 2 of Figure 1. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics education systems in Europe 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of tracks 29 2.83 1.28 1.00 5.00 
Age of first selection 29 13.07 2.28 10.00 16.00 
Central Exit Exams 26 0.42 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Administrative stand. 29 0.52 0.23 0.10 0.88 
Content related stand. 29 0.28 0.16 0.03 0.75 
Distance in km 29 940.69 505.55 264.00 2304.00 
Empire 29 0.45 0.51 0.00 1.00 
Pays réunis 29 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Pays conquis 29 0.24 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Pays allies 29 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Notes. The sources of the variables are described in the text. 
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Table 2: Pairwise correlations of the used variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Number of tracks 1.00 
        2. Age of selection -0.59 1.00 
       3. CEE -0.25 0.19 1.00 
      4. Admin. stand. -0.02 -0.01 0.33 1.00 
     5. Content stand. 0.33 -0.21 -0.18 0.18 1.00 
    6. Distance -0.59 0.46 0.05 -0.06 -0.26 1.00 
   7. Pays réunis 0.44 -0.06 -0.07 0.04 0.44 -0.50 1.00 
  8. Pays conquis -0.05 0.09 0.28 0.11 -0.23 -0.14 -0.11 1.00 
 9. Pays allies -0.40 0.02 0.19 0.04 0.01 0.51 -0.40 -0.29 1.00 
10. Empire 0.34 -0.12 -0.19 0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.13 -0.18 0.05 
Notes: 29 observations, except for the correlations with CEE which have 26 observations. 
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Table 3: The effect of political pressure from Napoleon on the number of tracks  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Distance  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Empire   1.031**  1.094*** 
  (0.375)  (0.387) 
Pays réunis   0.486 0.726 
   (0.532) (0.476) 
Pays conquis   -0.397 -0.097 
   (0.537) (0.484) 
Pays allies   -0.151 -0.051 
   (0.649) (0.573) 
Constant 4.344*** 3.932*** 4.053*** 3.326*** 
 
(0.444) (0.426) (0.677) (0.649) 
    
Observations 29 29 29 29 
Adjusted R² 0.32 0.45 0.29 0.45 
p F test  0.001 0.000 0.014 0.002 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: The effect of political pressure from Napoleon on the age of first selection 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Distance  0.002** 0.002** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Empire   -0.919  -0.760 
  (0.807)  (0.828) 
Pays réunis   0.788 0.621 
   (0.998) (1.018) 
Pays conquis   0.574 0.365 
   (1.007) (1.035) 
Pays allies   -1.643 -1.712 
   (1.218) (1.224) 
Constant 11.140*** 11.510*** 9.982*** 10.490*** 
 
(0.863) (0.917) (1.270) (1.387) 
    
Observations 29 29 29 29 
Adjusted R² 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.19 
p F test 0.015 0.028 0.053 0.074 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5: The effect of political pressure from Napoleon on the existence of central 
examinations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Distance  0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Empire   -0.170  -0.180 
  (0.207)  (0.215) 
Pays réunis   0.031 -0.039 
   (0.269) (0.284) 
Pays conquis   0.401 0.364 
   (0.262) (0.268) 
Pays allies   0.463 0.463 
   (0.297) (0.299) 
Constant 0.414* 0.484** 0.350 0.489 
 
(0.214) (0.232) (0.310) (0.354) 
    
Observations 26 26 26 26 
Adjusted R² -0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 
p F test 0.802 0.695 0.445 0.498 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: The effect of political pressure from Napoleon on the administrative standardization 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Distance  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Empire   0.005  0.021 
  (0.089)  (0.096) 
Pays réunis   0.040 0.045 
   (0.114) (0.119) 
Pays conquis   0.081 0.087 
   (0.115) (0.121) 
Pays allies   0.085 0.087 
   (0.139) (0.143) 
Constant 0.547*** 0.545*** 0.500*** 0.486*** 
 
(0.0930) (0.101) (0.145) (0.162) 
    
Observations 29 29 29 29 
Adjusted R² -0.03 -0.07 -0.13 -0.18 
p F test 0.758 0.953 0.941 0.976 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: The effect of political pressure from Napoleon on the content related standardization 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Distance  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Empire   0.011  0.016 
  (0.060)  (0.058) 
Pays réunis   0.140* 0.144* 
   (0.069) (0.072) 
Pays conquis   -0.052 -0.048 
   (0.070) (0.073) 
Pays allies   0.095 0.097 
   (0.084) (0.086) 
Constant 0.357*** 0.353*** 0.276*** 0.266** 
 
(0.063) (0.069) (0.088) (0.098) 
    
Observations 29 29 29 29 
Adjusted R² 0.04 0.00 0.16 0.13 
p F test 0.166 0.384 0.0865 0.153 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
